Keeping communal peace in the shadow of civil war: A natural experiment from Côte d'Ivoire
In: World development: the multi-disciplinary international journal devoted to the study and promotion of world development, Band 176, S. 106512
21 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
In: World development: the multi-disciplinary international journal devoted to the study and promotion of world development, Band 176, S. 106512
In: American political science review, S. 1-16
ISSN: 1537-5943
How does civilian protest shape civil war dynamics? Existing research shows that civilian protests against violence and war contribute to peace and restrain violence against civilians. There is less research on civilian protests that are at odds with peaceful conflict resolution, such as protests to salute armed actors, advocate against peace agreements, and oppose peacekeepers. This study develops a novel typology of wartime civilian protest that brings together protests to different ends, and theorizes the heterogeneous effects of protest on civil war dynamics. Using quantitative and qualitative evidence from new disaggregated and georeferenced event data from Côte d'Ivoire, the study demonstrates that—contingent on certain demands—protests were associated with violence against civilians, violence involving peacekeepers, and failed conflict resolution. These findings contribute new knowledge on how civilians shape the dynamics of civil war, and caution that nonviolent civilian action may not only be a force for de-escalation and peace.
In: Journal of peace research, S. 002234332211479
ISSN: 1460-3578
How, and under what conditions, does electoral violence influence voter turnout? Existing research often presumes that electoral violence demobilizes voters, but we lack knowledge of the conditions under which violence depresses turnout. This study takes a subnational approach to probe the moderating effect of local incumbent strength on the association between electoral violence and turnout. Based on existing work, I argue that electoral violence can reduce voter turnout by heightening threat perceptions among voters and eroding public trust in the electoral system, thereby raising the expected costs of voting and undermining the belief that one's vote matters. Moreover, I propose that in elections contested across multiple local rather than a single national voting district, the negative effect of electoral violence on turnout should be greater in districts where the incumbent is stronger. This is because when the incumbent is stronger, voters have lesser strategic and purposive incentives to vote than voters in localities where the opposition is stronger. I test the argument by combining original subnational event data on electoral violence before Côte d'Ivoire's 2021 legislative elections with electoral records. The results support the main hypothesis and indicate that electoral violence was associated with significantly lower voter turnout in voting districts where the incumbent was stronger, but not where the opposition was stronger. The study contributes new knowledge on the conditions under which electoral violence depresses voter turnout, and suggests that voters in opposition strongholds can be more resilient to electoral violence than often assumed.
In: Journal of peace research, Band 58, Heft 5, S. 930-944
ISSN: 1460-3578
Why is rebel governance more responsive in some areas than in others? In recent years, scholars have started to examine the determinants of rebel governance. Less attention has been given to explaining variation in the responsiveness of rebel governance, that is, the degree to which rebels are soliciting and acting upon civilian preferences in their governance. This article seeks to address this gap by studying local variation in rebel responsiveness. I argue that rebel responsiveness is a function of whether local elites control clientelist networks that allow them to mobilize local citizens. Strong clientelist networks are characterized by local elite control over resources and embeddedness in local authority structures. In turn, such networks shape local elites' capacity for mobilizing support for, or civil resistance against, the rebels, and hence their bargaining power in negotiations over rebel governance. Drawing on unique interview and archival data collected during eight months of fieldwork, as well as existing survey data, the study tests the argument through a systematic comparison of four areas held by the Forces Nouvelles in Côte d'Ivoire. The analysis indicates that the strength of local elites' clientelist networks shapes rebel responsiveness. Moreover, it provides support for the theorized civil resistance mechanism, and shows that this mechanism is further enhanced by ethnopolitical ties between civilians and rebels. These findings speak to the burgeoning literature on rebel governance and to research on civil resistance. In addition, the results inform policy debates on how to protect civilians in civil war.
Why is rebel governance more responsive in some areas than in others? In recent years, scholars have started to examine the determinants of rebel governance. Less attention has been given to explaining variation in the responsiveness of rebel governance, that is, the degree to which rebels are soliciting and acting upon civilian preferences in their governance. This article seeks to address this gap by studying local variation in rebel responsiveness. I argue that rebel responsiveness is a function of whether local elites control clientelist networks that allow them to mobilize local citizens. Strong clientelist networks are characterized by local elite control over resources and embeddedness in local authority structures. In turn, such networks shape local elites' capacity for mobilizing support for, or civil resistance against, the rebels, and hence their bargaining power in negotiations over rebel governance. Drawing on unique interview and archival data collected during eight months of fieldwork, as well as existing survey data, the study tests the argument through a systematic comparison of four areas held by the Forces Nouvelles in Côte d'Ivoire. The analysis indicates that the strength of local elites' clientelist networks shapes rebel responsiveness. Moreover, it provides support for the theorized civil resistance mechanism, and shows that this mechanism is further enhanced by ethnopolitical ties between civilians and rebels. These findings speak to the burgeoning literature on rebel governance and to research on civil resistance. In addition, the results inform policy debates on how to protect civilians in civil war.
BASE
Close to one billion people live in conflict zones around the world, many of them in areas under rebel influence. Research on civil war shows that rebels often engage in governing localities under their control by creating institutions and practices intended to shape the social, political, and economic life of civilians. However, we lack knowledge about why rebel governance is more responsive to civilians in some areas than in others. This study addresses this research gap by developing and testing a novel theoretical framework for explaining local variation in rebel responsiveness. Rebel responsiveness refers to the degree to which the rebels are soliciting and acting upon civilian preferences in the way in which they govern. The empirical investigation focuses on rebel governance by the Forces Nouvelles in Côte d'Ivoire between 2002 and 2010. To assess and refine the theoretical framework, the study conducts in-depth case studies of four localities: Odienné, northern Man, southern Man, and Vavoua. While the four areas shared several characteristics and were all governed by the Forces Nouvelles, rebel governance was responsive in Odienné and northern Man, but unresponsive in southern Man and Vavoua. The case analyses build on original and extensive material collected through interviews and in Ivorian archives. The study also tests the argument through a complementary quantitative analysis of 162 rebel-held areas in Côte d'Ivoire. The main conclusion of the study is that rebel governance was more responsive in areas with strong local elites than in areas with weak local elites. Strong local elites have extensive control over access to resources and enjoy high levels of social authority, which enables them to mobilise local citizens to either cooperate with or resist the rebels. This combination of cooperation and civil resistance incentivises rebels to make their rule more responsive towards civilians. The study refines our conception of rebel governance, generates new knowledge on the causes of rebel responsiveness, and sheds new light on how local elites and citizens shape rebel rule. Taken together, the findings have important implications for the protection of civilians in civil war.
BASE
This study considers the concept of rebel governance responsiveness by the Forces Nouvelles (FN) in Côte d'Ivoire. Responsiveness refers to the degree to which a government's political decisions correspond to its citizens' desires. The concept of responsiveness is vital for assessing regime types and constitutes an essential metric of democracy. However, the idea is rarely invoked in analyses of how rebel groups relate to civilian preferences in how they govern citizens in rebel areas. The study makes three contributions. First, it develops a conceptualisation of rebel responsiveness across four domains: representation, security, taxation, and welfare. Second, it demonstrates the concept's usefulness through a case study of two ethnic communities in Man, Côte d'Ivoire, using unique interview and archival data. The study shows that while the FN governed both ethnic communities, rebel responsiveness differed in significant ways. This finding highlights that focusing on the mere existence, rather than the responsiveness, of rebel governance is insufficient for capturing the nature of civilian life under rebel rule. Third, the study shows how focusing on rebel governance's responsiveness can uncover new insights about civil war. ; Cette étude examine le concept de « réactivité » dans le contexte de la gouvernance rebelle des Forces Nouvelles (FN) en Côte d'Ivoire. La réactivité de la gouvernance fait référence au degré auquel les décisions politiques d'un gouvernement correspondent aux désirs de ses citoyens. En science politique, le concept de réactivité est essentiel pour l'évaluation des types de régimes politiques et constitue une métrique importante de la démocratie. Malgré l'importance de la réactivité dans les débats sur la gouvernance de l'État, le concept est rarement invoqué dans les analyses de la façon dont les groupes rebelles intègrent les préférences des populations civiles dans leur manière de gouverner les territoires sous leur contrôle. Cette étude vise à approfondir les connaissances sur la gouvernance rebelle en développant le concept de réactivité rebelle. L'étude contribue triplement à la littérature sur la guerre civile. Premièrement, elle développe une conceptualisation de la réactivité rebelle qui permet de l'évaluer selon quatre dimensions : la représentation, la sécurité, la fiscalité et la prestation de services. Deuxièmement, l'étude démontre l'utilité du concept en conduisant une étude de cas approfondie de la gouvernance rebelle de deux communautés ethniques dans la ville de Man dans l'ouest de la Côte d'Ivoire, basée sur une série d'entretiens réalisés par l'auteur et sur des données d'archive. Entre 2002 et 2010, les deux communautés ethniques étaient gouvernées par les FN ; cependant, la gouvernance des FN différait de manière importante entre les deux communautés. Alors que les deux communautés ethniques étaient gouvernées par les FN durant la période étudiée, la réactivité de la gouvernance des FN différait de manière importante entre les deux communautés. Se concentrer sur la simple existence de la gouvernance rebelle sans prendre en compte sa réactivité apparait donc insuffisant pour saisir pleinement la nature de la vie civile sous domination rebelle. Troisièmement, l'étude examine comment le concept de réactivité de la gouvernance rebelle peut être utilisé pour identifier de nouvelles perspectives sur les dynamiques des guerres civiles ainsi que développer et tester de nouvelles théories sur les causes et les effets de la gouvernance rebelle.
BASE
In: Program on Governance and Local Development Working Paper No. 34
SSRN
Working paper
Information communications technologies (ICTs) like laptops, smartphones and portable storage devices facilitate travel, communication and documentation for researchers who conduct fieldwork. But despite increasing awareness about the ethical complications associated with using ICTs among journalists and humanitarians, there are few reflections on digital security among researchers. This article seeks to raise awareness of this important question by outlining three sets of ethical challenges related to digital security that may arise during the course of field research. These ethical challenges relate to (i) informed consent and confidentiality, (ii) collecting, transferring and storing sensitive data, and (iii) maintaining the personal security and integrity of the researcher. To help academics reflect on and mitigate these risks, the article underscores the importance of digital risk assessments and develops ten basic guidelines for field research in the digital age.
BASE
In: African affairs: the journal of the Royal African Society, Band 122, Heft 488, S. 447-460
ISSN: 1468-2621
Abstract
Almost a decade after the 2011 post-electoral crisis, Côte d'Ivoire once again held elections marred by widespread violence. The third-term crisis revolved around President Alassane Ouattara's controversial third-term bid and left at least 83 people dead and 633 people injured. This briefing draws on a new electoral violence dataset and field research to unpack patterns of violence during the crisis, and disentangles disruptive electoral violence related to the opposition's campaign to thwart the election from incidental electoral violence related to the overall electoral tension. The findings show that incidental violence was far deadlier than disruptive violence, yet only tenuously related to the national political divide. This incidental violence was often driven by pre-existing local resource conflicts, revenge, rumours and disinformation, and elite manipulation. The briefing contributes new knowledge on the local drivers of electoral violence in Côte d'Ivoire, and cautions that viewing local communities only as victims of elite rivalries can make decision-makers overlook important risk factors.
In: Small wars & insurgencies, Band 34, Heft 1, S. 221-246
ISSN: 1743-9558
The ruling RHDP's victory in legislative elections in March 2021 has tightened incumbent President Alassane Ouattara's grip on political power in Côte d'Ivoire. Though Ouattara has taken a conciliatory stance towards the opposition since his re-election, his control of political institutions, low voter turnout, electoral violence and the president's international status heighten the risk of further democratic backsliding in Côte d'Ivoire.
BASE
The ruling RHDP's victory in legislative elections in March 2021 has tightened incumbent President Alassane Ouattara's grip on political power in Côte d'Ivoire. Though Ouattara has taken a conciliatory stance towards the opposition since his re-election, his control of political institutions, low voter turnout, electoral violence and the president's international status heighten the risk of further democratic backsliding in Côte d'Ivoire.
BASE
The unexpected death this summer of the front-runner in the upcoming elections and incumbent President Ouattara's contested move to run for a third term in office has increased the risk of electoral violence in the ethnically divided Côte d'Ivoire. The threat of a return to armed conflict, as we saw after the 2010 elections, should not be excluded.
BASE
The unexpected death this summer of the front-runner in the upcoming elections and incumbent President Ouattara's contested move to run for a third term in office have increased the risk of electoral violence in the ethnically divided Côte d'Ivoire. The threat of a return to armed conflict, as we saw after the 2010 elections, should not be excluded.
BASE